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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND WADE'S ULTIMATE
POLITICAL FACT
RICHARD

S KAY*

The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom may be alive
but it is not exactly well. Over the last 40 years, the notion that Parliament may make
binding law on any question whatsoever has been buffeted by various political and
judicial developments and attacked by numerous academic commentators.' Looking
back, the 1950s might seem a sort of golden age of the doctrine. But the first line of Sir
William Wade's great article, 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty', published in 1955,
declared that a recent judgment had 'turned the thoughts of many lawyers to the
subject of legal sovereignty'. Dicey's 'classic exposition', he said, 'is now widely
controverted'. 2 Wade's immediate focus was the judgment of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of South Africa in Harris v Minister of the Interior, issued in

March 1952. 3 That court held that the Parliament of South Africa could not, by
ordinary legislation, change the law on the registration of 'non-European' voters in the
Cape Province. That legislation was part of an unrelenting attempt to reduce the
electoral influence of non-whites. The Appellate Division held that this kind of law
could only be enacted by the special procedure explicitly prescribed for such measures
in the South Africa Act 1909, the United Kingdom statute that operated as South
Africa's constitution. This procedure called for a two-thirds majority vote of the two
houses of Parliament sitting together.4 Further trouble for parliamentary sovereignty
was signalled the following year, in MacCormick v Lord Advocate. The Scottish Court
of Session had rejected a challenge to the legal effectiveness of the Royal Titles Act
1953, that had relied on the statute's claimed inconsistency with the 1707 Treaty of
Union between Scotland and England.5 While agreeing that the petition should be
rejected, Lord President Cooper, indulging in an extended dictum, doubted that 'the
Parliament of Great Britain should be "absolutely sovereign" in the sense that that
Parliament should be free to alter the Treaty at will'. Wade quoted from Cooper's
judgment on the first page of his article. He went on to list several academic
commentators who had predicted that the Diceyan 'bedrock will turn out to be
quicksand'. 6 So the validity of Parliament's claim to the right to 'make or unmake any
law whatever' was indeed in the air in 1955.' The burden of Wade's exposition was to
rehabilitate the rule and, at the same time, to provide a new explanation for it.

Wallace Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus and Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor,
University of Connecticut School of Law. I am indebted to Anthony Bradley for helpful
comments on a prior draft.
I summarized some of these developments in Richard S Kay, 'Changing the UK Constitution:
The Blind Sovereign' in Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland, and Alison Young (eds) Sovereignty
and the Law: Domestic, EuropeanandInternationalPerspectives (2014) 98.
2
H W R Wade, 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' [1955] CambridgeLaw Journal 172, 172.
3 (1952) 2 SA 428.
4 The term 'non-European' referred to voters of mixed race and to Asian voters. A clear summary
of the judgment is provided in Erwin N Griswold, 'The "Coloured Vote Case" in South Africa'
(1952) 65 Harvard Law Review 1361. Black South Africans had been denied any vote in
5
6

7

ordinary elections since 1936. Representationof Natives Act 1936 (SA) (No 12).

1953 SC 396. In particular, the petitioners objected to an implied authorization for Queen
Elizabeth to add 'the second' to her title as queen of the United Kingdom. See ibid 405-06.
Wade, above n 2, 173.
A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, Liberty Classics
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In 1955 Wade was 37-year-old law don at Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1961
he was to leave Cambridge for a chair in English Law at Oxford. (He returned to
Cambridge in 1978). In the same year he published the first edition of what ultimately
would become his magisterial treatise on administrative law, a subject on which he
would exert a profound and permanent influence. He continued to be a respected and
prolific scholar until his death in 2004. 8 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' remains one
of his most important and enduring contributions to constitutional law. One recent
monograph refers to Wade's argument as 'classic', 'crucially informing certain
approaches to parliamentary sovereignty'. 9 Another calls Wade 'Dicey's most
powerful apologist' and declares 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' to be 'one of the
most frequently cited [articles] in British constitutional law and theory'. 1° A recent
public law textbook says the article 'form[s] one of the foundations of the current
debate on parliamentary supremacy'."' As one senior judge put it, it 'remains for many
the classic exposition of sovereignty theory in the British context'. 12 Wade's striking
contribution in that essay was to provide a new and forceful explanation for the
foundational rule of parliamentary sovereignty in the British legal system. Wade
argued that the doctrine was not - and could not be - a mere rule of law. It was finally
an 'ultimate political fact'. Wade's explanation had wider applicability. It
demonstrated in a particularly clear way that all law must finally depend on a non-legal
foundation.
I WADE AND JENNINGS
Wade's first object was to demonstrate, notwithstanding certain apparently
contrary indications, that parliamentary sovereignty was still securely recognized in the
United Kingdom legal system. He cited strong dicta in several cases confirming the
doctrine and he distinguished those judgments (including Harris)that had been cited as
representing a different position.13 Mainly, however, he sought to rebut the statements
of academic commentators who had cast doubt on the illimitability of parliamentary
authority. Foremost among the academic sceptics he discussed was Sir Ivor Jennings
just arrived at Cambridge from 13 years at the University of Ceylon. Jennings had
addressed the subject in his treatise, The Law and the Constitution. He had argued that
if parliamentary authority were truly plenary, it should include the capacity to make
laws specifying how Parliament's power could be exercised. Although recognition of
such a parliamentary authority was in this version limited to 'manner and form' rules,

8

1982) 3-4.
Jack Beatson, 'Obituary: Sir William Wade', The Guardian (online), 24 March 2004
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/mar/24/guardianobituaries.highereducation>.

9

Michael Gordon, ParliamentarySovereignty in the UK Constitution, 6. See 75-89 contesting

Wade's account.
10 Peter C Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of ConstitutionalTheory in
Australia, Canada and New Zealand(2005) 20, 93.

11 Lisa Webley and Harriet Samuels, Complete Public Law (2015) 226.
Lord Irvine of Lairg, Human Rights, ConstitutionalLaw and the Development of the English
Legal System: Selected Essays (2003) 229.
13 He devoted particular attention to AG for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526
('Trethowan 's Case') in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had held that section
5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, prevented the New South Wales legislature from
repealing a statute which according to its own terms, was unrepealable except with the
concurrence of a referendum. Trethowan's Case was, at the time, a favorite citation for sceptics
of the 'continuing' version of the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. Wade, above n 2,
181-182.
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it would, Wade noted, 'swallow up the rule' of parliamentary sovereignty in its
substantive aspect as well. Any law could be entrenched beyond change by requiring
'any repealing act to be approved by, say, ninety percent of the electors in a
referendum'. 14
Apart from showing that Jennings' hypothesis had had no success in the decisions
of courts, 5 Wade attacked what he took to be a necessary assumption of Jennings'
position, namely that the permanent power of parliament was merely another legal
question and, therefore, it was subject to parliamentary revision. He denied that
parliamentary sovereignty was properly called a rule of law at all. In this he relied on
the reasoning of Sir John Salmond in his treatise on jurisprudence.16 In a famous
example, Salmond demonstrated that every chain of legal authorization had finally to
end in a non-legal source:
The rule that a man may not ride a bicycle on the footpath may have its source in the
by-laws of a municipal council; the rule that these by-laws have the force of law has its
source in an Act of Parliament. But whence comes the rule that Acts of Parliament
have the force of law? This is legally ultimate; its source is historical only not legal. 17
That historical rule, Wade explained, was not created by any law-making act and
it could not be abrogated by any such act. It was 'first and foremost a political reality',
'the ultimate politicalfact upon which the whole system of legislation depends'.' 8 This
did not mean that the rule of parliamentary sovereignty could not change, only that it
could not change by any kind of legislation. Alteration of the ultimate political fact had
to be the result of political change. That is to say it required a revolution. Wade cited
the British revolutions of the seventeenth century as examples and explained the
Harris case as an aspect of the revolution in which South Africa had been transformed
from a colony into a sovereign state. 19 He used the term advisedly. A revolution might
be neither violent nor abrupt. It occurred whenever one set of political facts supporting
a legal system was replaced by another.2 °
14
15

16

Ibid 181.
The one clear exception was the statement of the South African court in Ndlwana v Hofmeyer
NO (1937) AD 229. It was expressly repudiated by the Harris court (1952) 2 SA, 436-37. The
movement of that court from one understanding of parliamentary authority to an opposing one
demonstrated for Wade the essentially political character of the question. Wade, above n 2, 19293.
Wade cites the tenth edition prepared by Glanville Williams (Wade, above n 2, 187, n 43) but
Salmond made the same argument in the second edition published in 1907. See John W
Salmond, Jurisprudenceor the Theory of the Law

17

( nd

edition, 1907) §49, 125.

2
Qtd in Wade, above n 2, 187. If, however, as Peter
Oliver has argued, the ultimate rule was
'unresolved, ambiguous or penumbral', its further specification in certain instances might take a
more characteristically legal form. Peter C Oliver, 'Changes in the Ultimate Rule of a Legal

System: Uncertainty, Hard Cases, Commonwealth Precedents and the Importance of Context'
(2015) 26 King's Law Journal 367, 381-83. See also H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd
edition, 2012), 147-54. This possibility is discussed further below. See text below nn 55-57.
18

'9
20

Wade, above n 2, 188. Wade more or less took for granted that the ultimate political fact
governing the United Kingdom legal system was - at least at the time he was writing consistent with the Diceyan conception of parliamentary sovereignty.
Ibid 188-89, 190-93.

But see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament:History and Philosophy (1999)
245 (hereinafter Goldsworthy, History) (arguing this usage is inappropriate for most
constitutional change); Oliver, above n 10, 293-94, 315-16 (same). Goldsworthy subsequently

argued that changes in the underlying basis of British constitutional law could not properly be
characterized as revolutionary because that basis consisted of a kind of 'customary' law and that
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One last feature of Wade's picture of the sources of legal power needs to be
noted. Although the ultimate facts that support legal authority were political,
information about them needed to be inferred from judicial decisions. At the end, the
non-legal basis of law was 'in the keeping of the courts'. 21 Wade's attribution of this
role to the judiciary, however, was more assumed than argued. In fact, his categorical
description of this judicial function displayed a certainty that seems incongruous given
the essentially political nature of the underlying facts at issue:
This is only another way of saying that it is always for the courts, in the last resort, to
say what a valid Act of Parliament is; and that the decision of this question is not
determined by any rule of law which can be laid down or altered by any authority
outside the courts.22
Taken by itself, this statement looks to be a reference to some legal power that is
vested in the courts. That impression is reinforced by Wade's further assertion that the
courts 'have to decide for themselves . . . what they will recognize as the proper

expression of [a] new sovereign power' and that in this decision 'they have a perfectly
free choice'. 23 Subsequent commentators have noted the importance of this feature of
Wade's argument, one going so far as to describe his position as a 'court-based
account of sovereignty and "revolutions"'. 24 In his Hamlyn Lectures, delivered in
1980, Wade recognized that legal revolutions might take the form of outright illegal
actions but he also assumed that they could occur by a mere 'judicial shift in loyalty'.
Remarkably, he went on to argue that entrenched limits on Parliament might be created
by the simple enactment of a new judicial oath in which the judges pledged to
recognize statutes as valid only if they respected the new restrictions. The effect of
be a 'new fundamental law [that] is secured by a judiciary
such hand waving would
25
sworn to uphold it'.
Working from Wade's own premises, however, things could hardly be this
simple. If the courts are exercising this power in a genuinely revolutionary situation,
the decisions of the judges of the pre-revolutionary regime can at best constitute one
element of constitutional change. Any such transition must necessarily be 'a complex
process of reshaping or reconstituting a community's system of government' involving
'multiple constitutional and political actors'. 26 H L A Hart thought. that the 'rule of
recognition', the basis of law-making authority in any legal system, had to be
'effectively accepted as [a] common public standard of official behaviour by [the
system's] officials'. Those officials included, but were not limited to, the judges. 27 To
be sure, courts sometimes issue creative rulings that purport to specify a new ultimate
basis of a legal system. These rulings although necessarily made without the sanction
of existing law, may sometimes be effective. But, as Hart noted, '[h]ere all that
succeeds is success'. On other occasions, these questions 'may divide society too
change occasioned by a gradually emerging consensus among all of the senior officials of a legal
system was the ordinary way in which customary law changed. Jeffrey Goldsworthy,
21
22

23
24
25
26
27

ParliamentarySovereignty: Contemporary Debates (2010) 123-26 (hereinafter Goldsworthy,
Debates).
Goldsworthy, Debates,above n 20, 189.

Ibid. See also H W R Wade, 'Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution?' (1996) Law Quarterly
Review 568, 574 ('It is for the judges and not for Parliament to say what is an effective Act of
Parliament.').
Ibid 192

Nicholas Barber, Ultra Vires as Institutional Interdependence in Judicial Review and the
Constitution (2000) 111, 122.
H W R Wade, ConstitutionalFundamentals(1980) 29, 35-36 37-39.

Gordon, above n 9, 78. See also Goldsworthy, History, above n 20, 240-1.
Hart, above n 17, 116; Goldsworthy, Debates, above n 20, 45-46.
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fundamentally to permit of its disposition by a judicial decision'. 28 In such cases,
sooner or later, the courts (with the old judges or with new ones) will fall into line with
decisions that have been made elsewhere.

II WADE, KELSEN AND HART

Wade's articulation in 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' of the essentially
historical and political basis for the regime of parliamentary sovereignty and, therefore,
for the binding quality of all enacted law, has an obvious resonance with two of the
best known twentieth century writers in jurisprudence, Hans Kelsen and H L A Hart.
Wade's 'ultimate political fact,' however, differs from the analogous concepts
elaborated by each of these theorists and the distinctions help us better understand
Wade's ideas.
Kelsen, the innovative and influential Austrian-American legal thinker, first
expounded his version of the ultimate basis of law in The Pure Theory of Law,
originally published in German in 1934. He arrived at it, in the first instance, by
considering the necessary chain of validity of norms present in any legal system, an
examination not unlike that of Salmond that was cited in Wade's article. If, in an
effective legal system, we trace law-making capacity back to a 'first constitution', we
then need to 'presuppose' that the makers of that constitution had authority to create
valid law. This is the famous Basic Norm of legal validity on which so much of
Kelsen's jurisprudence depends.29 Its place seems to correspond to that reserved by
Wade for the 'ultimate political fact upon which the whole system of legislation
hangs'. 3 ° In a footnote to his discussion of Salmond, Wade referred to a 1940 book by
J W Jones for a discussion of 'the similarity between Salmond's 'ultimate legal
principle' and Kelsen's Grundnorm [Basic Norm]'. 3 1
In fact, Wade's 'ultimate political fact' and Kelsen's Basic Norm are intrinsically
different concepts. The latter is admittedly a difficult notion to pin down and it seemed
to change shapes over time as it appeared in Kelsen's voluminous writings. 32 But one
aspect is critical. Kelsen started with the basic Humean proposition that it was
impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. The normative force of a legal rule is
usually based on the fact that its making had been authorized by a higher legal rule.
But from where did the first norm authorizing all subsequent law-making derive its
binding quality? It was necessary to presuppose a valid norm simply positing that one
ought to obey the rules promulgated by the makers of the historically first
constitution.33 This presupposed Basic Norm serves as a 'hypothetical foundation'
supporting 'the normative import of all the material facts constituting the legal
system'. Its content is inferred from the actual posited laws of an effective legal
system. It is 'simply the expression of the necessary presupposition of every
positivistic understanding of legal data'. 34 The Basic Norm, that is to say, is a device
28

Ibid 149.

Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory: A Translation of Reine Rechtslehre
or Pure Theory of Law (trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley Paulson, 1992) 56-57.
30 Wade, above n 2, 188.
29

31 Ibid 187, n 43.

32 For one recent examination of the possibly inherent obscurity of Kelsen's Basic Norm see

Ricardo Guastini, 'The Basic Norm Revisited' in Luis Duarte d'Alameida, John Gardner and

Leslie Greene (eds) Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law (2013) 63.
33 Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (trans. Michael Hartney, 1991) 255.
34 Kelsen, above n 29, 58.
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for explaining, but only in a logical sense, the normativity of posited law. It is not the
product of the will of any person nor the reflection of anyone's actual understanding. It
has 'no substantive or material content'.35 Late in his career, Kelsen was clear that the
Basic Norm is a 'fiction'. It is premised on 'an imaginary authority whose (figmentary)
act of will has the Basic Norm as its meaning'. 36
For Wade, on the other hand, the foundation of law is a concrete historical reality.
It consists only of ideas but these are ideas that are held either explicitly or by
implication in the minds of actual human beings. It is telling that Wade repeatedly
described these basic beliefs as 'political'. And the examples he gave of the
establishment of these facts had a distinct historical character. He mentioned the
execution of Charles 1, the accession of William and Mary and (as a counter-example)
the failure of the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745. 37 Similarly, he viewed the
emergence of a new ultimate legal basis in South Africa as a consequence of the state's
gradual acquisition of political independence in the twentieth century. The independent
status of the Dominions had been recognized, but it was not really created, by the
Statute of Westminster, 1931 .38 And, as will be discussed in the next section, Wade
would come to much the same conclusion about the political events that resulted in the
subordination of parliamentary authority to European law after the Factortame (No. 2)
judgment. 39 As noted, for Wade the ultimate sign of such a revolution was found in the
behaviour of the judges but he was clear that in this respect the real action was outside
the courts. Speaking of the South African case, he said that the 'courts have followed
the movement of political events'. 4 ° In this respect, his conception of the basis of a
legal system was qualitatively different from Kelsen's abstract and strictly logical
Basic Norm.
H L A Hart whose great work, The Concept of Law, was published six years after
'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty', on the other hand, was, like Wade, convinced that
all legal authority was rooted in actual social phenomena. Hart posited a 'rule of
recognition' that stated the criteria for identifying valid law in a given legal system. So,
in the United Kingdom in 1961, Hart hypothesized, the rule could be stated 'Whatever
the Queen in Parliament enacts is law'. 41 In order to be a rule of recognition such a
proposition had to be 'effectively accepted as [a] common public standard[] of official
behaviour by [the legal system's] officials'. 42 Like Wade, therefore, Hart saw law as in
the final analysis based on the behaviour and attitudes of real human beings. Law
derived from 'social sources'. 43 In fact, when in 1996, Wade analyzed the change in
United Kingdom law effected by judicial recognition of the priority of European law
over parliamentary enactments, he asked whether the judges had adopted a new 'rule
of recognition,' citing Hart. 44 Notwithstanding evidence that Hart had read and thought

35

Stanley L Paulson, 'The Great Puzzle: Kelsen's Basic Norm' in Luis Duarte d'Alameida, John
Gardner and Leslie Greene (eds) Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law 43,

36

37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44

43-44 (2013).
Hans Kelsen, 'The Function of a Constitution' in Richard Tur and William Twining (eds) Essays
onKelsen (1986) 111, 117.
Wade, above n 2, 188.
Ibid 190.
Wade, above n 22.
Wade, above n 2, 191.
Hart, above n 17, 148.
Ibid 113. A legal system had to have such a rule of recognition and also to be generally obeyed
by the relevant population.
Hart, above n 17, 269 (postscript).
Wade, above n 22, 574.

Vol135(l)

Wade's 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty'

critically about Wade's article, 45 there were only three abbreviated references to it in
The Concept of Law, all in the notes. In the first he cited it as representing one answer
to the question of whether the rule of recognition is law or fact.46 In the second, he
47
referred to Wade's adoption of the 'continuing' version of parliamentary sovereignty.
And finally, he noted Wade's argument that the Parliament Acts, 1911 and 1949
provided for a kind of delegated legislative power.48 In contrast, Hart made very
frequent reference to Kelsen, including a long text note in which he agreed that that the
rule of recognition 'resemble[d]' Kelsen's Basic Norm but then listed various respects
in which the two ideas differed.49
Hart's analysis of the rule of recognition differed from Wade's ultimate political
fact in significant ways. Two will be mentioned here. The first, just averted to,
concerns the extent to which the basic rule of the legal system was a matter of fact or
of law. Wade's position was unclear but it was most consistent with a conclusion that it
was both law and fact. He repeatedly stated that the content of the underlying rule had
to be decided in the courts, thus suggesting that it was a matter of law. He was ready to
describe it as a rule of common law although, as such, it was in 'a class by itself'. 50 On
the other hand, he was emphatic in describing it as 'the ultimate political fact" and, as
we have already seen, its articulation by the judiciary responds to rather different
factors than would be the case with the enunciation of ordinary legal rules. For this rule
the judges 'follow[] the movement of political events' and make "a political or
legislative decision, having no 'law' to guide them'. 5' Hart built upon Wade's implicit
understanding with a more careful description of the rule of recognition. For him, its
characterization as law or fact depended on the perspective from which it was viewed.
Looked at from within the legal system, by someone who accepts the normative force
of that system, it was certainly a rule of law, the highest rule in the legal hierarchy.
Looked at from the 'external' point of view, for such purposes as asking whether such
a rule 'existed' or whether it was a suitable or unsuitable rule for a given society, it
could only be regarded as a matter of fact. 'Both these aspects claim attention
but we
52
cannot do justice to them both by choosing one of the labels, "law" or "fact."'
Secondly, Hart qualifies Wade's assertion that it is impossible, short of a
revolution, for Parliament to impose any limitations on the legislative power of future
parliaments. Wade's approach was not rigorously argued but it appears to have been
based on parliamentary sovereignty's status as the ultimate foundation of legislative
authority. It would be incongruous for the created power to be able alter the creating
one. 53 Hart agreed that, when it comes to the replacement of one rule of recognition
with a distinctly new one, mere legal authority would be insufficient even though such
changes might be articulated using the rhetoric of law.54 Where Wade and Hart
45

J W F Allison cites two letters and a postcard from Hart to Wade in 1955 and 1956 commenting
on the article. J W F Allison, 'Parliamentary Sovereignty, Europe and the Economy of the
Common Law' in Mads Andenas (ed) JudicialReview in InternationalPerspective (2000) 177,

185-86, nn 55, 63.
Hart, above n 17, 295.
47 Ibid 299. See text below nn 55-57.
48 lbid 299.
49 Ibid 292-94.
50 Wade, above n 2, 187-88.
46

51 Ibid 173, 188-89, 191, 192.
52

53
54

Hart, aboven 17, 110-12.
Wade, above n 2, 189.
Hart, above n 17, 117-23, 153. On this practice see Richard S Kay, The Glorious Revolution and
the Continuity of Law (2014); Richard S Kay, 'Legal Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change'
(1997) 7 CaribbeanLaw Review 161.
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differed was whether or not it was possible to specify precisely the contents of a rule of
recognition. Like all rules - indeed more than most rules - Hart's rule of recognition
has a certain open texture and may be susceptible of more than one interpretation.
When in the course of adjudication, uncertainties in the rule are clarified, it would be
inaccurate to say that a revolutionary change has taken place. 55 Exhibit number one for
Hart was the British rule of parliamentary sovereignty. He agreed that it was
'established' that the rule of recognition accepted by the courts was one identifying
'continuing sovereignty' under which no one Parliament could bind its successors. But
there was no 'necessity of logic' arising from the idea of sovereignty that required this
understanding. A legislature could be sovereign even if its power was 'self-limiting' as
suggested by Jennings. The received version of parliamentary sovereignty was 'after
all, only one interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence'. This question
had to be answered 'at any given moment' as a 'question of fact'. And in this case,
doubtless based on the authority marshalled by Wade, 'the presently accepted rule is
one of continuing sovereignty'. 56
III THE EBBING OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY
If the orthodox doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was being questioned in
1955, today it appears to be in be in full retreat. Several developments have had the
effect of imposing limits, even if ill-defined limits, on parliament's legislative power.
This is not the place to discuss these changes in any depth but we can list the
following, all of which at least tend in this direction: the priority of the law of the
European Union;57 the obligation to conform to the European Convention of Human
Rights; the amenability of statutory enforcement to judge-made norms through the
process of judicial review; the independence of former colonial possessions; the
autonomy of devolved legislatures; the employment of referenda on important issues.58
There are certainly others. It may be fair, in fact, to say that British constitutional
waters are being roiled to an extent not experienced in the last hundred years.
Wade, we must recall, never suggested that the ultimate political fact at the
foundation of the legal system could never be changed. He only asserted that it could
not be changed by Parliament exercising its ordinary legislative power. The 'ultimate
legal principle' was changed not by legislation but by revolution. 'Of course,' he said,
,revolutions can and do occur.' Wade expected the fact of such a revolution to be
confirmed by actions of the courts but, as we have seen, in such cases the courts must
rely on something other than the usual artifacts of law. This is what he understood to
have happened in South Africa. Sometime between the enactment by the United
Kingdom Parliament of the South Africa Act 1909 and the 1952 decision of the
Appellate Division in the Harriscase, the ultimate political fact upon which the South
African legal system was founded changed. South African law ceased to trace its
authority to the law-making power of the United Kingdom Parliament. The 'seat of
sovereign legal power . . . shifted from Westminster to Pretoria.' This was not,

however, a consequence of a legislative decision - neither the enactment by the United
55

56

57
58

See Oliver, above n 17; Allison, above n 45. Peter Oliver provides a thorough and careful
explanation of the emergence of the independence of the Dominions in these terms in Oliver,
above n 10.
Hart, above n 17, 149-50. Hart includes an elliptical reference to Wade in the notes to his
discussion but it is unclear if he means it to support his conclusion about the prevailing
understanding of the United Kingdom rule of recognition: at 299.
This priority will remain an issue at least until the verdict of the June 23, 2016 referendum is
translated into law by the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 (UK).
See Kay, above n 1, 99-103.
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Kingdom of the Statute of Westminster 1931 nor the enactment by the South African
parliament of the South African Status of the Union Act 1934, both of which purported
to effect such a change. Although the South African courts would, in fact, follow the
declarations in these statutes, their behavior would not follow from their 'legal
pedigree'. The judgments of the courts would rather constitute a judicial
acknowledgement that South Africa had 'thrown off [its] allegiance to the United
Kingdom', that a political revolution had taken place. This was no less true just
because, as in Harris, 'the whole case was argued as if there were a right or wrong
legal answer'. Beneath this 'elaborate legal dress' would necessarily be 'the naked fact
of revolution' even though that revolution had been accomplished 'in an atmosphere of
harmony'. 59
This raises for us the question of how Wade's understanding fits with the
apparent change in the United Kingdom Parliament's law-making jurisdiction. He
observed and commented on some of the indicators of this change but not others.
Faithful to Wade's assumptions, we can examine those changes by considering what
has been said about the question in the courts, most notably in the United Kingdom's
court of last resort, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords and, since 2009, the
Supreme Court. While there is nothing in that court's judgments that can be interpreted
as an explicit and definitive recognition of a new basic rule, something can be learned
by examining the dicta in several opinions. In 1991 the House of Lords in its decision
in R. v Secretary of State for Transport ex p. FactortameLtd. (No. 2)60 affirmed the

propriety of judicial interim relief that prevented the application of an act of Parliament
that had been found to be in conflict with European law. This decision was based on
section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972, declaring that European law was
to prevail over any statutes 'passed or to be passed'. 61 To the extent that this statute
prevented Parliament from passing any new law that contravened European law, it had
done what Dicey had said was impossible. It successfully restricted the continuing
plenary legislative authority of the Queen in Parliament. In his speech in the case, Lord
Bridge described the holding in broad terms. By passing the 1972 Act, Parliament had
embraced an 'entirely voluntary' 'limitation of its sovereignty'. And at the same time,
the courts came under a duty to 'override any rule of national law found to be in
conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law'. 62 Wade understood the
judgment to have invoked, or at least to have acknowledged, a qualitatively new source
of legal authority: 'While Britain remains in the Community we are in a regime in
which Parliament has bound its successors successfully, and which is nothing if not
revolutionary'. 63 Wade ascribed a critical role in this transformation to the judges,

declaring that 'the courts are reformulating the fundamental rules about the
effectiveness of Acts of Parliament'. 64 He seems to have understood, however, that
they were simply responding to extrajudicial political change by recognizing the
'primacy [of European law] that practical politics obviously required'. 65
59 Wade, above n 2, 191-92.
60 [1991] 1 AC 603.
61 The House of Lords did not exactly hold the statute invalid since strictly, it only decided the
appropriateness in the circumstances of interim relief. The law of interim relief predated the
enactment of the European Communities Act 1972 and could be subordinated to European law
on much more conventional grounds. P P Craig, 'Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament
62
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The precise shape of this new constitutional situation was still unclear after
Factortame.Wade was unwilling to assume that the judicial treatment of the European
Communities Act 1972 set a precedent for other new and different exercises of
parliamentary self-limitation. Accession to the European Communities, he supposed,
66
could be understood as providing a unique occasion for restricting future legislation.
He was also prepared to agree that while legislation would have to be consistent with
European law as long as the United Kingdom remained a member of the European
Communities, Parliament retained the power to terminate that membership and to
repeal the European Communities Act altogether, something that, as a consequence of
June 23, 2016, has been transformed from a
the referendum on the question on
6
hypothetical to a practical question. 7
The fact of a constitutional revolution in the United Kingdom has been confirmed
but its character has been revealed very imperfectly in the judicial expressions that
have followed Factortame. Most attention has been paid to R (Jackson) v Attorney-

General6 8 in which the House of Lords affirmed the validity of a statue passed
pursuant to the ParliamentAct 1949. That act, permitting certain bills passed by the
House of Commons to become law without the assent of the House of Lords, had itself
been enacted pursuant to the ParliamentAct 1911 which had established a similar
though somewhat stricter procedure for cases when the Commons acted alone. The
complainants now argued that the 1949 Parliament, acting under the 1911 Act, had to
have been exercising a kind of delegated legislative power and it had no right to
enlarge its own authority: the 1949 Act was, therefore, invalid and so was the act at
issue in Jackson.69 The various speeches of the Law Lords rejecting this claim cover a
great deal of ground and it is not easy to distill a single judgment. But the majority
appeared to reject the premise that the 1911 Act had created only a form of subordinate
law-making. Statutes enacted under the Parliament Acts were full-fledged primary
Acts of Parliament.7 0 The necessary inference was that the Parliaments of 1911 and of
1949, by dispensing with the requirement of approval by the Lords, had thereby
redefined the ingredients of parliamentary legislation. Baroness Hale made the
implications explicit: If Parliament could redefine the legislative process to make it
easier, why couldn't it make it harder requiring, say, 'a particular parliamentary
majority or a popular referendum for particular types of measure'. 7 This, of course, is
exactly what Jennings and other proponents of the possibility of 'manner and form'
limitation had argued. Lord Steyn took the opportunity to stress that a 'pure and
absolute' parliamentary sovereignty was 'out of place in the modem United Kingdom'.
It was not 'unthinkable', moreover, that 'the courts may have to qualify a principle
established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism'. 72
In 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty', Wade had discussed the relevance of the
Parliament Acts, arguing, like the complainants in Jackson, that they allowed the
Commons to exercise only a delegated law-making power. He supported this claim by
noting that unlike the principal rule of parliamentary sovereignty that was based only
on political fact, legislation under the Parliament Acts derived its validity by virtue of
66
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70
71
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another instance of positive law. The Acts required the Commons, in exercising the
power created, to include a recitation that it acted 'in accordance with the Parliament
Acts 1911 and 1949 and by authority of the same'. Statutes so created, therefore, did
73
not flow directly from the basic, legally ultimate empowerment of Parliament.
Wade's position clearly assumed that this ultimate principle remained beyond the
reach of Parliament. He did not, however, as we have noted, preclude the possibility
that a revolution might set up a new and different principle (one, as Lord Steyn said,
based on a 'different hypothesis of constitutionalism') and that that principle might
then be recognized by courts taking account of the new political reality.
The speeches in Jackson left the extent of parliamentary power to redefine
legislative jurisdiction mostly undefined. Several, however, made it clear that the Law
Lords believed that this power had limits. While rejecting the judgment below that the
Parliament Act 1911 empowered only 'modest' changes in the unilateral law-making
authority of the House of Commons, some of the judgments assumed that major or
fundamental constitutional changes were excluded. So Lord Steyn doubted that the
Parliament Acts could be used to abolish the House of Lords altogether. He questioned
'the validity of such an exorbitant assertion of government power in our bi-cameral
system' even though it might be justified by 'strict legalism'. 74 And Lord Brown of
Eaton-Under-Heywood was 'not prepared to give such a ruling as would sanction in
advance the use of the 1911 Act for all purposes. .. , 75
In fact, it turned out that even the apparently clear rule about European Union law
that stemmed from the Factortame case was more complicated than might first have
appeared. In R. (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport76 the

Supreme Court dismissed complaints that the procedure used for planning high speed
rail routes in Great Britain was inconsistent with certain European Union directives.
Because the attack on the planning process arraigned, in part, the adequacy of certain
parliamentary procedures, some judges took the opportunity to speculate on the
relationship between the judicial enforcement of European law and the Bill of Rights
1689, article 9. The latter provided that 'freedom of speech and debates or proceedings
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court [...]'. A

straightforward reading of Factortamesuggested that the Bill of Rights, like any other
domestic statute, should be subordinated to European law. It was one thing, however,
according to the joint judgment of Lords Neuberger and Mance, to refuse to apply the
Merchant Shipping Act involved in Factortame. It would be quite another to

subordinate the 'fundamental' principles 'enshrined in the Bill of Rights'- a
'constitutional instrument'.
The judgment went on to list several other such
instruments and it assumed that there might be other fundamental principles
'recognized at common law'. It would be reasonable to think that Parliament in 1972
77
'did not either contemplate or authorize the abrogation' of these basic rules.
What this reasoning suggested was that there were at least three categories of
laws, each immune in different degree from alteration by subsequent law 73
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71
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fundamental constitutional laws, European law and ordinary law, with the first and last
appearing in either enactments or in common law. How exactly these categories would
interact is impossible to know given the tentative and elliptical expressions of the
judges. (Since the European Communities Act 1972 was itself listed as a 'fundamental
statute' it is possible, as Mark Elliott has observed, there may be some rank ordering
even within that category.) 8 This would be a matter, the judges assumed, that is for
'United Kingdom law and courts to determine'. 79 In this respect, the current situation
was accurately described by Sir Stephen Sedley as involving a 'bi-polar sovereignty of
the Crown in Parliament and the Crown in its courts, to each of which the Crown's
ministers are answerable - politically to Parliament, legally to the courts'. 8 ° Wade's
ultimate political fact was fairly simple to understand at a time when, as he believed, it
consisted solely of the acceptance of the unlimited ability of Parliament to make law.
But, if the suggested reasoning of Lords Neuberger and Mance is followed, that fact
will be a complex and compound fact. Beyond that it seems (at least so long as the
United Kingdom fails to adopt a comprehensive written constitution) to support
constitutional arrangements that are perpetually in flux while the courts (as Wade
assumed) continue to read and re-read the political values prevailing in society. 81

IV POLITICAL FACTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS

Unsurprisingly, given his particular focus, Wade's analysis has received the most
attention in the United Kingdom, where there is no single constitutional text at the top
of the legal hierarchy, one created at a discrete historical moment. The absence of such
a text makes it harder to defend or dispute any single argument about the ultimate
source of legal authority, since multiple and conflicting theories may be consistent
with the historical operation of that system. Wade, however, seems to have understood
his explanation of the ultimate basis of a legal system to be also applicable to systems
governed by written constitutions. His description of the South African Appellate
Division's decision in Harris makes this clear. The court in that case held that the
South African Parliament could not amend the constitution other than according to the
terms of the South Africa Act 1909. The government had claimed that the amendment
rules in that statute could be altered by a simple enactment of the Parliament of South
Africa. It relied, in this regard, on the statement of the powers belonging to Dominion
legislatures that had been set forth in the Statue of Westminster 1931. That Act had
recognized the authority of those legislatures to make laws inconsistent with United
Kingdom statutes, including, one would have thought, the South Africa Act 1909. The
Appellate Division disagreed, holding the 1909 Act still bound the South Africa
Parliament. According to Wade, this judgment showed two things. First, South
African courts had 'thrown off their allegiance to the United Kingdom parliament',
that 'a revolution had already taken place'. Second, in such circumstances the
Appellate Division was obliged to 'seek 'ultimate principles' of [its] own'. 82 This
inquiry was something for which 'there was no ... necessary legal answer.' The court

'had in substance to make a political decision'.
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continued to limit the South Africa Parliament had nothing to do with the law-making
authority of the United Kingdom Parliament in 1909 or 1931. A new 'ultimate political
fact' had established the sovereignty of the South African parliament but only within
the limits set by the Act. On Wade's view - as qualified above - this outcome emerged
from the Appellate Division's reading of South African political opinion as to the
proper exercise and shape of parliamentary power.
A court's political judgment, of course, is only as good as that court's ability
accurately to estimate the relevant political facts on the ground. When courts engage
in this kind of enterprise they run the risk of misreading the critical data. Subsequent
history suggests that that was the case with the Harrisjudgment. Within months of the
decision the offended South African Parliament passed legislation declaring itself a
'High Court' with the power to review all Supreme Court judgments that invalidated
statutes. Armed with his new 'judicial' authority Parliament promptly reversed the
Harrisdecision. The Appellate Division then held that, insofar as the 'High Court Act'
permitted Parliament effectively to supersede the entrenched amendment rules, that
Act was also invalid. 84 After some grumbling, the government submitted to this ruling
and left the voting rolls unchanged for the next election. 85 In 1955, however, the year
of the Wade article, Parliament reformed and enlarged the membership of the Senate in
such a way as to give the government party enough Senators to command a two-thirds
majority in a joint sitting. This allowed the government to pass the change in voting
rights in the Cape Province according to the procedures specified in the South Africa
Act. Parliament so constituted also repealed the entrenched special amendment
procedure for such measures. These actions were, when brought back to the Appellate
Division (the membership of which had been enlarged to permit the appointment of
more government friendly judges) upheld. 86 Wade wrote a short commentary on this
case. He confined his observations to a conventional, even a pedestrian legal analysis.
Having determined that the South African legal system had been detached from that of
the United Kingdom, Wade seemed content to treat the case as suitable for decision
according to conventional legal process in that independent system.87
The upshot of all of these events was, in fact, not one but two 'revolutions' or,
perhaps a single revolution the outcome of which only became apparent after all three
judgments had been issued. The first stage represented by Harris, recognized the
autonomy of the South African legal system but held that it was controlled by the
entrenched rules of the South Africa Act. At the second stage, the government's
successful reformation of the Senate allowed the elimination of the entrenched
procedure for manipulating the voter rolls, thus leaving South Africa with only a single
entrenched provision. The result was a regime of otherwise unlimited parliamentary
sovereignty. 88 Exploiting this power, the Parliament (after approval in a referendum
of white voters) created a new constitution in 1961, establishing the 'Republic of South
Africa', continuing the exclusion of all black representation. That constitution was in
turn replaced by the 'tri-cameral' constitution of 1983, also approved after a whites8
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only referendum, which remodelled the parliament while maintaining the
disenfranchisement of black South Africans. That constitution did entrench a number
of provisions by requiring either simple or two-thirds majorities for certain changes in
all three houses. 89 The 1983 constitution remained in effect until the dissolution of the
apartheid state in 1993 and the enactment (negotiated among the relevant parties but
formally approved under the 1983 amendment procedure) of the Interim Constitution
of that year. 90
This sequence of events illustrates how even legal systems with constitutional
texts respond to changes in the underlying political assumptions. Kelsen's descriptions
of the Basic Norm displayed a similar relationship. The Basic Norm 'presupposes that
one is to behave as the historically first constitution prescribes'. 9' The Basic Norm
'empowers' the creators of the constitution to promulgate binding norms. When
applied to the more concrete versions of ultimate facts relied on by Wade and Hart, this
points us to the political data that allowed the historical creators of a written
constitution to be accepted as legitimate 92law-makers. The resulting constitution then
derives its force from those political facts.
The juxtaposition of constitutional texts and logically prior 'ultimate political
facts' has the potential to create a particular problem. One of the values of a written
constitution is supposed to be the stability that its rules provide. Therefore,
constitutions are deliberately made hard to modify. Over time, political values in a
society are bound to change. When this happens there is no guarantee that the
constitutional text will be able to keep up with these new political circumstances.
There are various ways to deal with such a misalignment. The most straightforward
response is simply to replace the constitution. When many United Kingdom colonies
achieved independence in the middle of the last century, they initially operated under
constitutions that were, in substantial part, written by British colonial officials in
consultation with various local interests. These texts were then promulgated by the
United Kingdom authorities usually as parts of Orders in Council. Typically, these
'independence constitutions' maintained the Westminster system of government and
the formal role of the Queen as head of state. As time passed, some of the local
governments began to feel it inconsistent with national dignity to continue to do
business under these arrangements. The response was, at least sometimes, simply to
scrap the 93offending document and initiate a fresh domestic constitution-making
procedure.

Often, however, a polity with a written constitution does not respond to
fundamental political change by an explicit substitution of a new constitutional text.
There are many reasons for this. There may be agreement that the old text is outdated
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but no agreement on what ought to replace it. There may be a strong cultural
attachment to legal regularity that inhibits extralegal change. The old constitution may
have attracted a symbolic importance that makes explicit replacement impossible. In
these cases, a legal system might be stuck with a written constitution that had been
created in a very different political situation. The problem for such systems is how,
under these circumstances, to maintain the legitimacy of the constitutional regime. The
policy of retaining a constitutional text after its original political basis has disappeared
was responsible for some of the difficulties involved in the 'patriation' of the Canadian
Constitution (the British North America Act 1867) in 1980-82. In that case, the

participants had no legal directions for deciding the relative roles of the different actors
(the federal government, the provinces and the Westminster Parliament) in modifying
constitutional rules. At the end, a holding by the Supreme Court of Canada about a
Canadian convention governing constitutional change was critically important.94
The most successful example of a constitutional text surviving critical political
changes is probably that of the United States Constitution, now 230 years old and with
relatively few amendments, it was drafted by an unofficial convention in 1787 and was
then, in accordance with its own terms, ratified by specially called conventions in nine
(and eventually all thirteen) states. 95 At the time, this kind of approval was understood
to be the most effective way in which the 'people' could express its endorsement. The
Constitution's subsequent acceptance - after a bitter and contentious national debate may, in substantial measure, be attributed to this perceived popular approval. 96 The
idea that the 'people' was the source of all legitimate constituent power was the master
political dogma of late eighteenth century America. The very independence of the
United States was founded on the 'right of the people to alter or abolish their
governments'. 97 Widespread belief in that right constituted the 'ultimate political fact'
at the time of constitution-making.
Perhaps more remarkably, the force of the United States Constitution continues
to be justified by reference to the will of 'we the people'. 98 This understanding appears
hard to reconcile with the actual assent that the Constitution received in 1787-89. The
ratifying conventions were composed exclusively of propertied white men, chosen in
elections with restricted franchises. The approval of those bodies is very far from
today's beliefs about the way to register the approval of 'the people'. 99 That the
Constitution remains legitimate is mainly due to a widespread refusal to delve too
deeply into the actual historical facts associated with the Constitution's creation.
Something quite similar happened in South Africa with respect to the acceptance of the
94
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Constitution of 1997. That constitution was promulgated by an interim parliament after
a very extensive national consultation. Its content, however, was constrained by certain
principles - some broad, some quite specific - that had been hammered out by a
process of elite negotiation among the unelected representatives of various interest
groups. The agreement that emerged from those negotiations resulted in the
termination of the apartheid regime. The new Constitution's preamble, nonetheless,
began with the standard statement that it was the act of 'we the people of South
Africa'. Within a remarkably short period, this dubious statement was widely accepted.
A website created to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the Constitution and urging
individuals to 'tell the world why we love our constitution' was titled
'wethepeople.org.za'. 100
Wade had recognized that the political facts supporting any legal system could
and inevitably would change over time. Periods when these facts are changing will
generally be accompanied by some uncertainty as to the nature of the consequent
'revolution' and how that revolution may affect the legal reach of the constitution. This
may be obvious in the United Kingdom, where the constitution, by virtue of its
uncodified character, may be especially subject to contestation. But it is also true in
countries where the constitution is incorporated in an identifiable text. The great
controversy over the nature of the American union that dominated public discourse in
the first half of the nineteenth century turned, in substantial part, on differing beliefs
about the political assumptions underlying the Constitution. The parties disagreed on
the question of whether the Constitution was effective as the agreement of the
'peoples' of the individual sovereign states or as the act of the undivided 'people of the
United States'. The text itself (notwithstanding the opening phrase of the preamble)
was not conclusive on this question. Finally, the matter was resolved by political and
military means in favour of the latter interpretation. It would be ridiculous to suppose
that this was a reliable way to decide the 'correct' historical basis of the Constitution.
Rather, the 'ultimate political fact' on which the constitutional regime depended had
itself to be settled by extra-legal means.' 0 ' At the end of the day, as Wade's analysis
demonstrated, the authority of all law rests on a political foundation.
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